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Abstract. An intrusion tolerant database uses damage assessment tech-
niques to detect damage propagation scales in a corrupted database sys-
tem. Traditional damage assessment approaches in a intrusion tolerant
database system can only locate damages which are caused by reading
corrupted data. In fact, there are many other damage spreading patterns
that have not been considered in traditional damage assessment model.
In this paper, we systematically analyze inter-transaction dependency
relationships that have been neglected in the previous research and pro-
pose four diﬀerent dependency relationships between transactions which
may cause damage propagation. We extend existing damage assessment
model based on the four novel dependency relationships. The essential
properties of our model is also discussed.
Keywords: Data integrity, database recovery, damage assessment.
1 Introduction
A database system being able to detect intrusions and recover compromised data
back to a consistent state is claimed to be an intrusion tolerant database system
(or attack resistant, or self healing system) [1][2][3][4][5]. As it is shown in Fig. 1,
most intrusion tolerant database systems consist of the following modules: Sys-
tem Log, Intrusion Detector, Damage Assessor, and Data Repairer. The clients
commit various transactions to execute the application logic, and these trans-
actions aﬀect the integrity and consistency of a database system. The Intrusion
Detector tracks clients’ behaviors, and detects intrusion activities of malicious
clients based on the system log. For the data that is corrupted by malicious trans-
actions, the Damage Assessor detects the scale of damage propagation and the
Data Repairer generates compensation transactions to repair the compromised
data. An intrusion tolerant database is built based on a traditional relational
model. It can be considered as an extension to the relational database system
since the modules can be either built into the kernel of DBMS [3][4][5][6] or
developed on top of DBMS (serves as a middleware between DBMS and the
clients)[1][2].
The technologies of intrusion detection, transaction processing, and database
auditing can be used to develop an intrusion tolerant database system. Dam-
age Assessment is the most critical phase during the whole damage recovery
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Fig. 1. Architecture of a fault tolerant database system
process[7]. The Damage assessor concerns the issues on how the damage appears
and in what way the damage can be detected and exposed. Nowadays, most
damage assessment algorithms rely on a model on how innocent data are af-
fected in a compromised database system (denoted damage spreading patterns).
The model evaluates damage spreading patterns by analyzing the dependencies
between transactions. A Read-Write Dependency is the most common damage
spreading pattern: in a transaction history H: T1, ..., T2.... Supposing transaction
T2 reads the results modiﬁed by transaction T1 (we claim that transaction T2 is
read-write dependent upon T1), and then writes data x to the database system,
then we say transaction T2 is aﬀected by T1 and data x is corrupted. Existing
damage assessment models deal with this kind of damage spreading pattern,
and various algorithms and prototypes were developed based on it. However,
except for the Read-Write Dependency, do there exist any other dependency re-
lationships between transactions that cause damage spreading? To answer this
question, some deeper issues towards the inter-transaction dependencies should
be referred to. In essence, the dependency between transactions derives from
the issue of data sharing. The read or write operations in diﬀerent transactions
towards the same data may generate a dependency relationship between the
transactions. For a data item x and transaction T1 and T2 (T2 is scheduled af-
ter T1), there are totally four data sharing modes that may connect T1 and T2
together: 1)∃ a read operation r1 in T1 and a read operation r2 in T2, r1 and r2
read x ; 2)∃ a read operation r1 in T1 and a write operation w2 in T2, r1 read x
and w2 write x ; 3)∃ a write operation w1 in T1 and a read operation r2 in T2,
w1 write x and r2 read x ; 4) ∃ a write operation w1 in T1 and a write operation
w2 in T2, both w1 and w2 write x. We denote above four situations Read-Read
mode, Write-Read mode, Read-Write mode, and Write-Write mode separately.
The Read-Read and Write-Read modes do not lead to a dependency relationship
from T2 to T1 because the read operation in transaction T2 can not cause a state
transition for database system (we claim that only write operations can change
the DB state). So we focus on the Read-Write and Write-Write modes, and
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extract dependency relationships between transactions due to the two categories
of data sharing modes.
In this paper, we systematically analyze the dependency relationships be-
tween transactions corresponding to the Read-Write and Write-Write data shar-
ing modes. We proposed four novel inter-transaction dependency relationships
which may lead to damage propagation, and illustrate how these dependencies
help the damages to spread to a larger scale. Based on that, we propose our dam-
age assessment model to detect aﬀected transactions that are corrupted by the
malicious transactions due to the new proposed inter-transaction dependencies.
The model is an essential extension to existing read-write dependency model,
and makes the results of damage recovery more accurate.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 is devoted to the review
of existing damage assessment methods and damage repair systems. In section 3
we analyze the dependency relationships between transactions according to the
Read-Write and Write-Write data sharing modes, and give the formal descrip-
tions of four inter-transaction dependencies which may cause damage propaga-
tion. In section 4, we propose an extended damage assessment model by taking
the new dependency relationships into account. Section 5 discusses the essential
features of our model.
2 Related Work
There are mainly two categories of damage assessment models. The ﬁrst is Ap-
plication Level Damage Tracking [6][8]. In this model, an application-program-
analyzer module is constructed to capture the damage propagation in the
application layer. Supposing a variable x in a program is corrupted by a mali-
cious user, damage can be spread to the data whose producer references to the
variable x. Furthermore, in case that an IF-ELSE code fragment references to
the variable x, the control logic for the program can be changed and the dam-
age may be propagated due to the corrupted logic control caused by variable x.
Application level damage tracking is devoted to capture above damage spread-
ing patterns and record the related information so as to facilitate the recovery
activities (e.g. the before image of corrupted data). The second damage assess-
ment model is Inter-Transaction Dependency Tracking. This model assesses the
damage scale in the layer of database system. Transactions which have a de-
pendency relationship with the malicious transactions are identiﬁed as aﬀected
and those data whose producer is aﬀected are labeled corrupted. A Read-Write
Dependency is the most common damage spreading pattern investigated so far.
Yu et al. proposed another damage spreading pattern: Control Dependency [9].
Transaction T2 being control dependent on T1 indicates that the execution of
transaction T2 is determined by transaction T1. In database layer, the control
dependency is mainly caused by triggers. A control dependency on a malicious
transaction causes damage spreading to an incorrect execution path. Since trig-
gers can be considered as a fragment of code, so to some extent, the control
dependency is much similar to application level tracking.
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Comparing the two models, the application level damage tracking is more ac-
curate and eﬀective. In the application layer, the inherent program structure can
describe the read-write dependency relationship between data evidently, while
on the contrary, the SQL is not capable to express the complicated semantics
(the sequence, branch and cycle structure (IF-ELSE, WHILE etc.)) if stored pro-
cedure is not used. However, in database level, a log of transaction history can
be easily obtained from the inherent mechanisms in DBMS such as auditing and
trigger, so that the damage tracking becomes not so complicated based on the
transaction log. Due to the simplicity and eﬃciency of database level tracking,
the inter-transaction dependency tracking model draws much attention in recent
decades. Up to now, most self-healing systems still adopt the inter-transaction
dependency tracking model for the damage assessment [3][10][11][12].
Existing inter-transaction dependency tracking model is incomplete, and cer-
tain dependencies between transactions have not been concerned. Consequently,
the damage assessment algorithms causes a violation to Completeness Criteria
for damage recovery [9]. To address this problem, we systematically discuss the
inter-transaction dependencies that may cause damage spreading in this paper.
3 Inter-transaction Dependency Relationships Analysis
As it is described above, the damage propagation is mainly caused by the Read-
Write mode and Write-Write mode of data sharing. Extracting the Read-Write
Dependency relationship between transactions is the basic resolution in current
damage assessment model. This method mainly contributes to discover the dam-
age propagation caused by the Read-Write mode. In this section, we focus on
the Write-Write data sharing mode and analyze which kind of inter-transaction
dependency relationships related to this data sharing mode may cause damage
spreading. We discover four categories of inter-transaction dependency relation-
ships which may produce compromised data.
There is a special dependency relationship between transactions: In a trans-
action history H : T1...T2... where transaction T2 is not read-write dependent
on transaction T1. If we construct a new transaction history H ′ : ...T2... which
indicates that if transaction T1 doesn’t execute, then in transaction history H’,
transaction T2 should have read some data which were modiﬁed by transaction
T1 in history H. Furthermore, if T1 is malicious, T2 should be regarded as an
aﬀected transaction and captured by the damage assessment. It seems that T1
and T2 are connected with some phantoms data which T2 should have read in
semantics (see an example in Fig.2). We refer to this kind of inter-transaction de-
pendency as Phantoms Dependency (note that the concept has been mentioned
in [6][13][14]). The Phantoms Dependency is an important damage propagation
pattern which has signiﬁcant destructive power on database systems. Unfortu-
nately, the former inter-transaction dependency tracking model does not con-
sider the Phantoms Dependency, thus the damage assessment algorithms are
not completely eﬀective.
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Application Logic:
An increase of commodity prices: we need the price of commodity whose price is
more than $500 increased by 10%.
Intrusion Activity:
Assume that before the price increase activity occurs, there is a malicious
transaction B1 modiﬁes the product rice’s price
from $400 to $600. The correspondent transaction history is described as follows:
Correlated Database Layer SQL statements:
G0: UPDATE product SET price = 600 WHERE product name = ”rice”;
B1: UPDATE product SET price = 400 WHERE product name = ”rice”;
G1: UPDATE product SET price = 1.1 ∗ price WHERE price > 500;
– In the application above, we can see that transaction G1 did not read from B1, and
thus there was no read-write dependency from G1 to B1. So in traditional inter-
transaction damage tracking model, G1 would not been treated as an aﬀected
transaction, and only malicious transaction B1 would be undone.
– Suppose we only undid malicious transaction B1, then the price of product rice was
written back to $400. But is that the correct recovery result? Obviously no, because
all products’ prices increased by 10%, except for the product rice! Therefore, we
conclude that the execution of transaction B1 did aﬀect transaction G1, and G1
was no longer innocent.
– In a deeper sight, if B1 did not exist, G1 should have read the record ”rice” and
made modiﬁcations on its price. But in fact, the transaction B1 did exist, and the
undo transaction for B1 made the recovery result incomplete for the product rice’s
price did not increase. Some modiﬁcations requested by transaction G1 were lost.
In the common sense, It seemed that G1 was aﬀected by B1 for G1 read a phantom
data ”rice”. We denote the dependency from G1 to B1 as Phantoms Dependency.
A novel damage assessment approach should be proposed to track this dependency
and identify G1 as an aﬀected transaction.
Fig. 2. Phantoms Dependency between transactions
In a transaction history, some transactions’ execution is dependent on other
transactions so as to satisfy the inherent integrity constraints in DBMSs, such as
Entity Integrity, Domain Integrity, and Reference Integrity). On the point of se-
curity, the integrity constrains may also help to propagate damage in the context
of data sharing: Suppose that an innocent transaction’s execution is dependent
upon a malicious transaction so that the integrity constraints are bypassed for
the innocent transaction, it can be indicated that the innocent transaction is
not benign any more and it is probable to cause damage propagation. We sum-
marize three categories of inter-transaction dependencies related to the inherent
integrity constraints as follows:
Pseudo-Identity Dependency. In some cases, the execution of an innocent
transaction is dependent upon a malicious transaction so that it bypasses the
Entity Integrity Constraint. For the instance described in Fig.3, malicious trans-
action B deletes a record (product id=”P002”) in table product (subﬁgure (b)),
and then innocent transaction G inserts a new tuple with the same primary
key product id P002 (see subﬁgure (c)). In this transaction history, it is obvious
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product id (PK) name price
P000 rice $400
P001 banana $230
P002 orange $120
P003 apple $100
P004 ﬂour $460
(a) Initial state of table product
product id (PK) name price
P000 rice $400
P001 banana $230
P003 apple $100
P004 ﬂour $460
(b) Malicious transaction B deletes
the record with product id=”P002”
product id (PK) name price
P000 rice $400
P001 banana $230
P003 apple $100
P004 ﬂour $460
P002 grape $320
(c) innocent transaction G in-
serts a new record with prod-
uct id=”P002”
Fig. 3. Pseudo-Identity Dependency between transactions
that the execution of transaction G is dependent on B (if the product P002
was not deleted by transaction B, transaction G could not have been executed
successfully). In our intuitive feeling, transaction G creates a new entity with
a pseudo identity to substitute the historical object so as to satisfy the entity
integrity constraint. We denote this kind of dependency from G to B as Pseudo-
Identity Dependency. The transactions that have a pseudo-identity dependency
relationship with a malicious transaction should be considered as aﬀected. Un-
fortunately, the Pseudo-Identity Dependency can not be captured by current
damage assessment algorithms.
Domain-Integrity Dependency. The execution of an innocent transaction
is dependent upon a malicious transaction so that it can satisfy the Domain
Integrity Constraint. There are mainly two categories of domain integrity con-
straints (namely CHECK constrains) in DBMSs: ﬁeld integrity constraint (e.g.
CHECK (column1 < 50)) and row integrity constraint (e.g. CHECK (column1 <
colmn2)). The inherent row integrity constraints in DBMSs protect the secu-
rity of database systems; however, they are not capable to prevent all damage
spreading patterns. For the example in Fig.4, suppose that the application logic
requires the purchase price be lower than retail price and imposes a row integrity
constraint CHECK(p price < r price). The initial state for table product is
given in Subﬁgure (a). Now consider the following scenario: malicious trans-
action B modiﬁes product P000 ’s p price to $350 (Subﬁgure (b)), and then,
innocent transaction G renews product P000 ’s r price to $360 (Subﬁgure (c)).
In this transaction history, there seems no CHECK constrains violation, but
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product id (PK) p price r price
P000 $400 $500
P001 $230 $246
P002 $460 $486
(a) Initial state of table product,
where a domain integrity constraint
CHECK(p price < r price) is im-
posed on table product
product id (PK) p price r price
P000 $350 $500
P001 $230 $246
P002 $460 $486
(b) Malicious transaction B updates
the record with product id=”P000”
and decreases purchase price to $350
product id(PK) p price r price
P000 $350 $360
P001 $230 $246
P002 $460 $486
(c) Innocent transaction G UPDATE
the record with product id=”P000”
and decreases retail price to $360
Fig. 4. Domain-Integrity Dependency between transactions
the damage spreading does occur: transaction G’s UPDATE operation is depen-
dent on B ; in other words, if B did not exist, G would not have been executed
successfully due to the CHECK constraint imposed on table product (if B did
not exist, G renewed r price to $360, then the function CHECK ($400<$360 )
would return a value false). Therefore, the CHECK can not deal with this pat-
tern of damage propagation, and even worse, one can not recover the product
P000 ’s p price to the correct value (because when the recovery activity to undo
the product’s p price to $400 was launched, the function CHECK ($400<$360 )
would return a value false). In our work, we denote the dependency relationship
from transaction G to B as Domain-Integrity Dependency, and incorporate it in
our damage assessment model.
Reference-Integrity Dependency. As we all know, the inherent Reference
Integrity Constraints in DBMSs provides the SET-NULL and CASCADE policy
to protect data consistency in data sharing [15]. However, these two policies also
help to propagate new damage if they are utilized by an intruder: A malicious
DELETE operation on the main table will impose a negative impact on the slave
table if a SET-NULL or CASCADE policy exists in the main and slave tables.
Fortunately, the trigger mechanism in DBMSs facilitates traditional damage as-
sessment models to recover the cascade deleted data in slave tables (the cascade
delete operations in the slave tables can be captured by triggers). However, there
is still a possibility that some innocent transactions depend upon a malicious
transaction and thus bypass the reference integrity Constraint and cause damage
propagation. For the instance in Fig.5, the main table product and the slave table
order with a foreign key constraint order (p id) referencing product(product id)
(see Subﬁgure (a) and (b)). Now assume that a malicious transaction B cre-
ates a product P002 (see Subﬁgure (c)) and that an innocent transaction G
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product id (PK) p price r price
P000 $400 $500
P001 $230 $246
(a) Main table product
order id(PK) p id(FK) quantity
O001 P000 500
O002 P001 300
(b) Initial state of slave table or-
der, where a foreign key constraint
in which order(p id) references to
product(product id) without any CAS-
CADE policy
product id (PK) p price r price
P000 $400 $500
P001 $230 $246
P002 $460 $486
(c) Malicious transaction B inserts a
product with product id=”P002” into
main table product
order id(PK) p id(FK) quantity
O001 P000 500
O002 P001 300
O003 P002 260
(d) Innocent transaction G inserts a
new order that references to product
P002
Fig. 5. Reference-Integrity Dependency between transactions
generates a new order O003 referencing product P002. It is obvious that the
execution of transaction G is dependent on B. This dependency relationship
should be captured by damage assessment algorithms. We refer to this kind of
dependency from G to B as Reference-Integrity Dependency. Traditional dam-
age assessment models cannot discover the damage spreading patterns caused
by Reference-Integrity Dependency. Even worse, the corrupted data caused by
B could not be recovered in traditional models: the rollback transaction for B
would delete product P002 in the main table product. If a DO-NULL policy is
used for the reference integrity constraint, the DELETE operation will return
an error; otherwise, if a SET-NULL policy is imposed on the tables, the recov-
ery for transaction B is incomplete because the order O003 still existed with
the foreign key p id being set to null. Only the CASCADE policy will bring a
complete recovery.
4 Damage Assessment Model
In this section, we give the formal deﬁnitions for the Phantoms Dependency,
Pseudo-Identity Dependency, Domain-Integrity Dependency and Reference-
Integrity Dependency between transactions. Meanwhile, a detail on how these
inter-transaction dependencies cause damage spreading is explained. Finally, we
propose our extended damage assessment model which is devoted to discover the
new damage propagation patterns relative to the new deﬁned inter-transaction
dependencies.
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4.1 Preliminaries
Before we propose the damage assessment model, we ﬁrst introduce some basic
concepts. A transaction history to be repaired is a serializable history generated
under the two phase locking principle. We denote the committed malicious trans-
actions in a history by a set B={B1, B2 , ..., Bm}, and the committed benign
transactions in a history by a collection G={G1, G2, ..., Gn}. For a transaction
history H over B∪G, we deﬁne <H as the usual partial order on B∪G for his-
tory H, where Ti <H Tj indicates that the operations of Ti are scheduled before
the conﬂicting operations of Tj. Two operations conﬂict if they are on the same
data item and at least one is write operation. Two transactions conﬂict if they
have conﬂicting operations[1]. Even if transactions Ti and Tj are not conﬂict
transactions, we still use the notation Ti <H Tj to denote that Ti is scheduled
before Tj by DBMS.
As our best knowledge, in DBMS, a write-involved SQL statement t is exe-
cuted in the following process: 1) DBMS loads the data blocks requested by t
to the main memory; and 2) DBMS writes back the modiﬁed data from main
memory to DB ﬁles after t is executed. So on this point, we assume that when
a write-involved SQL statement executes a write operation requesting data set
x, implicitly, it has a read operation towards x ﬁrstly. For example, a write-
involved SQL statement could be UPDATE product SET price = 1.1 ∗ price
WHERE price > 500. In semantics, it is equivalent to the sequence: SELECT price
FROM product WHERE price > 500, and UPDATE product SET price = 1.1 ∗ price
WHERE price > 500. Therefore a write-involved SQL statement can be divided
into a read operation and a succeeding write operation (this method was used
in the damage assessment algorithms in [3][6]). In our work, when we mention
the read operation, it not only refers to the SELECT operation, but also the
read operations in the write-involved statements. Formally, a read operation on
a data item x for transaction T is denoted by [SELECT, x, img, T]1.
The UPDATE statement has the semantics that it modiﬁes certain data to
new values. In a transaction history, it can be assumed that an UNDATE state-
ment is equivalent to a sequence of a DELETE operation and a succeeding
INSERT operation (for example, for a UPDATE involved statement UPDATE
product SET price = $100 WHERE product id = ”P001”, the statement ﬁrst
deletes the product P001 ’s price and then inserts a new value $100 in the same
position). For simplicity, we use DELETE operations to denote the DELETE
statements and the DELETE semantics for UPDATE involved statements; simi-
larly, we refer to the INSERT statements and the INSERT semantics for
UPDATE involved statements as INSERT operations. Therefore, an UPDATE
statement can be substituted by the sequence of an DELETE operation and
a succeeding INSERT operation. Meanwhile, we claim that the write operation
consists of INSERT and DELETE operations (the objective is to omit UPDATE
1 In the label [SELECT, x, img, T], img represents the value of data item x. We denote
data item x with a three-tuple x(table,v pk,column) where v pk refers to the value
of the primary key of table, and it identiﬁes the row number of data x.
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operations for simplicity). Formally, a write operation is denoted as [OPTYPE,
item, b img, a img, tran id]2.
The existing models to detect the damage propagation are mainly based on
the Read-Write Dependency relationship between transactions. Previous works
[1][16] give the deﬁnition of Read-Write Dependency relationship, and we intro-
duce it to our work.
Deﬁnition 1 (Read-Write Dependency). Transaction Tj is Read-Write Depen-
dent upon transaction Ti in a transaction history if there exists a data item x
such that:
1) Tj reads x after Ti wrote x ;
2) Ti does not abort before Tj reads x ;
3) every transaction that writes x between the time when Ti writes x and the
time when Tj reads x is aborted.
In our work, we use the notation →W to denote the Read-Write Dependency.
Transaction Tj is Read-Write Dependent upon transaction Ti is denoted by Ti
→W Tj .
4.2 Phantoms Dependency
Section 3 describes the problem for phantoms dependency. Intuitively, transac-
tion T2 is dependent on T1 because T2 reads a phantoms data from T1. In other
words, if we change the transaction history and add an undo transaction UT1
behind T1, then in the new transaction history, T2 may read from T1. On this
point of view, we propose the formal deﬁnition for the phantoms dependency as
follows:
Deﬁnition 2 (Phantoms Dependency). Consider a transaction history H:..., T1,
..., T2,... that satisﬁes:
1) there exists a write operation op1 in T1 and an read operation op2 in T2;
2) T1<HT2;
3) T1→WT2 does not hold.
Let s1 be the set of data written by op1. Assume that transactions are executed
according to another transaction history H’:..., T2, ... (where transaction T1 is
removed from transaction history H ). Let s2 be the set of data read by op2 in
transaction history H’. If s1∩s2 =Ø , we say T2 is Phantoms Dependent upon
T1, and operations op1 and op2 are Phantoms Conﬂict operations.
We use the notation →P to denote the Phantoms Dependency. Transaction
Tj being phantoms dependent upon transaction Ti is denoted by Ti →PTj.
2 Here [OPTYPE, item, b img, a img, tran id] means that the transaction tran id
writes the data item and modiﬁes its value from b img to a img. OP-
TYPE∈{INSERT, DELETE}. For OPTYPE=DELETE, a img is null while for
OPTYPE=INSERT, b img=null.
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4.3 Pseudo-identity Dependency
As described in section 2, some transactions’ execution is dependent on some
other transactions so that the Entity Integrity Constraint may be bypassed.
This inter-transaction dependency may cause damage propagation if a malicious
transaction is dependent. This dependency should be considered in the damage
assessment model.
Deﬁnition 3 (Pseudo-Identity Dependency). Given a transaction history H:...,
T1,..., T2,... and two conﬂict transactions T1 and T2 that satisfy:
1) T1<HT1;
2) there exist a DELETE operation op1 [DELETE, x, b img, -, T1] in T1 and
an INSERT operation op2 [INSERT, x, -, a img, T2] in T2, where x.column is
the PRIMARY KEY or UNIQUE KEY of x.table.
Then we say transaction T2 is Pseudo-Identity Dependent upon T1, and opera-
tions op1 and op2 are Pseudo-Identity conﬂict operations.
We use the notation →I to denote the Pseudo-Identity Dependency. Trans-
action Tj being pseudo-identity dependent upon transaction Ti is denoted by Ti
→I Tj.
4.4 Domain-Integrity Dependency
The domain integrity dependency is derived from the row level domain integrity
constraint. It means that if two transactions each has a INSERT operation to-
wards the same row and if the data items that the INSERT operations write are
restricted by the CHECK constraint, then there is a domain integrity depen-
dency relationship between the two transactions.
Deﬁnition 4 (Domain-Integrity Dependency). Given a transaction history H:...,
T1, ..., T2,... and two transactions T1 and T2 (T1<HT2) in H that satisfy:
1) there exist INSERT operations op1 [INSERT, x, -, v1, T1] and op2 [INSERT,
y, -, v2, T2] satisfying that x.v pk = y.v pk, and x.table = y.table;
2) there exists a row-level domain integrity constraint CHECK[col1, col2, ...,
coln]3 (n≥2 ) on x.table and x.column, y.column ∈ {col1, col2, ..., coln}.
we say transaction T2 is Domain-Integrity Dependent upon T1, and operations
op1 and op2 are Domain-Integrity conﬂict operations.
We use the notation →D to denote the Domain-Integrity Dependency. Trans-
action Tj being domain-integrity dependent upon transaction Ti is denoted by
Ti →D Tj.
4.5 Reference-Integrity Dependency
The reference integrity constraints also lead to dependency relationships between
transactions: when a transaction with an INSERT operation which references to
3 Here col1, col2, ..., coln denote the constrained columns for the CHECK constraint.
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another table, this dependency is formulated. We deﬁne this kind of dependency
as follows:
Deﬁnition 5 (Reference-Integrity Dependency). Consider a transaction history
H:..., T1, ..., T2,... and two transactions T1 and T2 (T1<HT2) in H that satisfy:
1) there exist INSERT operations op1 [INSERT, x, -, v1, T1] and op2 [INSERT,
y, -, v2, T2] and
2) there exists a reference integrity constraint from y.table (y.column) to x.table
(x.column) so that the insertion of v2 is referenced to the value of v1.
We say transaction T2 is Reference-Integrity Dependent upon T1, and operations
op1 and op2 are Reference-Integrity conﬂict operations.
We use the notation→R to denote the Reference-Integrity Dependency. Trans-
action Tj being reference-integrity dependent upon transaction Ti is denoted by
Ti →R Tj.
4.6 Damage Assessment Model
With a set of malicious transactions as input, the damage assessment algorithm
outputs the aﬀected transactions as well as the corrupted data in a transaction
history so as to recovery the database to a consistent state. The assessment
process is based on a transaction dependency relation which is maintained in
the execution period of transactions. The transaction dependency relation keeps
track of phantoms dependency, pseudo-identity dependency, domain-integrity
dependency and reference-integrity dependency between transactions. The for-
mal deﬁnition of transaction dependency relation is given below:
Deﬁnition 6 (Transaction Dependency Relation for a Transaction History).
Given a transaction history H, and a binary relations D = {< Ti, Tj > |Ti →W
Tj, or Ti →P Tj,or Ti →I Tj , or Ti →D Tj, or Ti →R Tj} in H, the transaction
dependency relation DH in history H is deﬁned to satisfy DH=t(D) (here t(D)
represents the transitive closure of relation D).
Notation ”→” is introduced to denote the transaction dependency between
two transactions. Let Ti→Tj denote < Ti, Tj >∈ DH .
In a transaction history H: B∪G, where B is the set of malicious transactions
and G=¬B. The damage assessment discovers the set of aﬀected transactions A
according to following recursive deﬁnition:
1) if < Bk, Ti >∈ DH , where DH is the transaction dependency relation in H,
then Ti∈A;
2) if Ti ∈ A and < Ti, Tj >∈ DH , then Tj∈A.
5 Discussion
To explain the damage assessment model, we construct a transaction history H
based on tables product and order in Fig.6 as follows:
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p id (PK) name p price r price
P000 apple $400 $500
P001 orange $600 $700
P003 rice $100 $110
(a) Initial state of table product
o id(PK) p id(FK) quantity
O001 P000 500
O002 P001 300
(b) Initial state of table order.
– A foreign key constraint in which order(p id)references to product(product id), and
a domain integrity constraint CHECK(p price < r price) are imposed on table
product.
Fig. 6. A sample database to explain our damage assessment model
– T0: INSERT INTO product VALUES (”P004”,”flour”, 30, 50);
– T1: INSERT INTO product VALUES (”P002”,”grape”, 460, 486);
– T2: UPDATE product SET r price = ”650” WHERE p id = ”P001”;
– T3: SELECT p id FROM product WHERE name = ”grape”;
UPDATE shopping cart SET quatity = 1 WHERE p id = ”P002”;
– T4: UPDATE product SET r price = 1.1∗r price WHERE r price > 680;
– T5: UPDATE product SET p id = ”P008” WHERE name = ”apple”;
– T6: INSERT INTO product VALUES (”P000”,banana, 100, 120);
– T7: UPDATE product SET p price = 80 WHERE p id = ”P003”;
– T8: UPDATE product SET r price = 90 WHERE p id = ”P003”;
– T9: INSERT INTO order VALUES (”O003”,”P002”, 700);
– T10: UPDATE product SET r price = 150 WHERE p id = ”P004”;
According to our transaction dependency deﬁnitions, we can derive:
T1→WT3, T2→PT4, T5→IT6, T7→DT8, T1→RT9, T0→WT10. In transaction his-
tory H, the transaction dependency relation is DH = {< T1, T3 >,< T2, T4 >,
< T5, T6 >,< T7, T8 >,< T1, T9 >,< T0, T10 >}. If the malicious set of transac-
tions is B = {T1, T2, T5, T7}, then according to our damage assessment model,
the aﬀected transactions set is A = {T3, T4, T6, T8, T9}. Traditional damage as-
sessment model only regards transaction T3 as aﬀected transactions. In fact, T4,
T6, T8, and T9 are also aﬀected by malicious transactions. Therefore, our model
captures a larger scale of damage propagation.
Finally, we discuss some essential features of the four novel transaction de-
pendencies. In essence, the four dependencies can be regarded as an extension
to the read-write dependency. For Phantoms Dependency, in above transaction
history H , we have T2→PT4, since transaction T4 should have read the record
whose p id = ”P001” (the UPDATE operation can be seen as a combination
operation of SELECT and UPDATE in semantics). The execution process of
T4, can be divided into two steps: 1) looking up all records and picking up the
records whose r price > 680; 2) updating the ﬁelds ”r price” for related records.
From step 1), it’s reasonable for us to consider that T4 has read all records in
table product including the record whose p id = ”P001”. Namely, transaction T4
implicitly reads from transaction T2. Therefore, on this point, we can say Phan-
toms Dependency is an extension of read-write dependency. For Pseudo-Identity
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dependency in transaction history H , we have T5→IT6. The execution process of
T6 can be divided into the following steps: 1) Integrity constrain check: checking
whether there is a record in table product has the primary key p id = ”P000”; 2)
Inserting a new record. In step 1), the integrity constrain check can be considered
that transaction T6 implicitly reads the primary keys of all records, including the
records which have been deleted. Consequently, Pseudo-Identity dependency can
also be considered as an extension to the read-write dependency. For Domain
Integrity and Reference Integrity dependencies, we can consider that the aﬀected
transaction implicitly read from another transaction in the period of constraint
checking. Therefore, in essence, the four dependencies can be seen as an extension
to the read-write dependency. Furthermore, from a technical point of view, it is a
complicated process to capture the four dependencies. For Phantoms and Pseudo
Identity dependencies, an additional table should be maintained to record the
before image of each update involved operations. This is because maintaining the
modiﬁcation history is essential for damage assessment. For Domain Integrity
and Reference Integrity dependencies, the constraints check should be trans-
formed to a appropriate ”implicit read” action. These properties require a more
complicated technical resolution than handling read-write dependency. This also
proves the useability of our work.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we systematically analyze the inter-transaction dependencies which
may cause damage propagation.We propose to consider four new dependencies in
damage assessment. An extended damage assessment model is built according to
the dependencies. We also discuss some essential features of these dependencies.
Though these dependencies can be regarded as an extension to the read-write
dependency, they must be independently evaluated in damage assessment and
recovery. We are currently building a damage assessment and recovery prototype
based on our model by revamping the kernel of Dameng [17] database system.
The evaluation results will be reported in an extension work of this paper.
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